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IN THE INTEREST OF A CHILD:
A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER

WISCONSIN AND MINNESOTA CUSTODY
STATUTES
THOMAS J. WALSH*

Perhaps the best course is to try to distinguish them.., to examine
how they differ from one another and which is to be preferred.1
I. INTRODUCTION

In the Book of Kings, King Solomon must decide who will be
awarded custody of an infant. Rather than turning to a statute book to
determine which was to be preferred, his first request was, "'Get me a
sword.' ''2 He then announced that he would "'[c]ut the living child in
two, and give half to one woman and half to the other.' ,3 When the
biological mother protested and was willing to give up her child on the
condition that the baby's life be spared, the king gave his custodial
judgment, "'Give the first one the living child! By no means kill it, for
she is the mother.' ... When all Israel heard the judgment the king had

given, they were in awe of him, because they4 saw that the king had in
him the wisdom of God for giving judgment. ,
While the methods used and factors considered by King Solomon
are somewhat shocking, the problem remains the same in today's family
courts-how to decide the best living arrangements for children in
divided families. Judges today, unlike King Solomon, may be required
to consider a more lengthy list of factors when deciding custody, but the
methods that each judge uses in applying them remain as diverse as the
number of judges themselves.
. B.A., Marquette University; J.D., Hamline University School of Law. The author is
currently a partner at the law firm of Walsh & Walsh, S.C.
1. PLATO, GORGIAS 106 (Walter Hamilton trans., 1960).
2. 1 Kings 3:24 (The New American).
3. 1 Kings 3:25.
4. 1 Kings 3:26-28.
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When analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of a statutory system
and the methodology used in applying that system, a comparison to
another system for a point of reference is helpful in order to distinguish
them and determine which is to be preferred. This Article will examine
the child custody and placement statutes of Wisconsin and Minnesota.
While these states have a history of producing similar legislation, they
have some marked differences in the area of child custody and
placement. The comparison of these two systems will facilitate a better
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of each system.
This Article will examine the history of custody and placement in the
United States generally and then specifically in Wisconsin and
Minnesota. Next, the Article will compare the specific custodial factors
that Wisconsin and Minnesota family court judges currently have to
consider when making a custody decision. Finally, based upon this
comparison, this Article will discuss the concept of parenting plans,
which can be viewed as the next progressive step in the development of
methods to resolve custody and placement disputes. This discussion will
also include recommendations for changes in the custodial statutes of
each state.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECrIVE

A. The Common Law
King Solomon's resolution of a custody dispute between two
individuals in ancient Israel may be one of the first recorded accounts of
a dispute over children being decided in d public forum. Yet, married
couples have been getting divorced for as long as they have been getting
married.5 Divorce was recognized as far back as the Code of
Hammurabi in 2100 B.C., the Assyrian Code of Ashur in 1100 B.C., the
Hebrew Code in 600 B.C., the Egyptian Code of 300 B.C., and under
Roman law.6
Given that the United States's legal system is generally based upon
the common law model of Great Britain, it is no surprise that early child
custody laws in the United States were based upon the common law
principles set forth in that country. Under early Anglo-Saxon law, a
wife was free to leave a marriage and take her children and one-half of

5. Stephen Aldrich, Faultsin Fault-BasedDivorce, MINN. BENCH & B., Aug. 1996, at 30.
6. Id.
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the property with her.7 However, the situation changed upon the rise of
the feudal order and the power of the church.8 For approximately 900
years, the subordination of mothers prevailed in the English family law
system.9 The husband had almost absolute control over his children and
the mother almost no control." As an extension of this control, the
husband and father also possessed the lion's share of the rights upon
dissolution of the marriage." In the realm of child custody, English law
viewed children as possessions of the father and thus custody of those
children was the absolute right of the father irrespective of the child's
best interests." The father supported the children and they were
considered his property. 3 As a result, when the marriage split up, he
was entitled to his children's services. Moreover, because the mother
was also considered the property of the father, she was not even entitled
to visitation rights. This control continued as long as the feudal system
remained" and came to the United States when the colonies were
founded.
In the United States, custody theory seems to have developed in
three stages.' The first stage is represented by a legislative and judicial
preference for the father in custody cases. The second stage is
represented by a swing in favor of the mother. This stage led to the
development of what was subsequently called the "tender years"
doctrine or the "mothers love" preference. The final stage, which also
has various developmental substages of its own, is focused upon the
abolition of preferences and the creation of a set of "factors" by which a
court analyzes the "best interests of the child."
7. Henry H. Foster & Doris Freed, Life With Father:1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321,321 (1978)
(citing Dooms of Aethelbert, Nos. 79-81, reprintedin I ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS
OF ENGLAND (1840) ("[If she wish to go away with her children, let her have half of the
property. If the husband wish to have them, (let her portion be) as one child. If she bears no
child, let paternal kindred have the 'fich' and the 'morgengyfe.'").
8. Foster &Freed, supranote 7, at 321.
9. Id.

10. See, e.g., King v. DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804); Exparte Skinner, 9
Moore 278 (C.P. 1824).
11. Skinner, 9 Moore at 321-22.
12. Sherri A. Ahl, A Step Backwards The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts a "Primary

Caretaker"Presumption in Child Custody Cases: Pikula v. Pikula, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1344,
1347 (1986). This principle from English law had its origin in Roman private law. Id.
13. Id. n.14.
14. Id.; see also Wellesley v. Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236,243 (ch. 1827).
15. See Foster & Freed, supra note 7, at 321-22.
16. See infra notes 17-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of these stages.
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The common law preference for the father, adopted from England,
continued in the United States until the late nineteenth or early
8 the Kansas Supreme Court
twentieth century.' In Chapsky v. Wood,"
clearly articulated the common law rule which prevailed in the United
States:
The father is the natural guardian and is prima facie entitled to
the custody of his minor child. This right springs from two
sources: one is, that [it is] he who brings a child,... into life... ;

the other reason is, that it is a law of nature that the affection
which springs from such a relation as that is stronger and more
potent than any which springs from any other human relation."
The late nineteenth to early twentieth century saw a shift away from
the paternal presumption in custody cases. At that time, the courts
generally started to express the notion that the best interests of the child
should be of paramount importance when deciding custody. However,
while this became the stated standard, in reality, there was a shift in
focus from a presumption favoring the father to the diametrically
opposed presumption in favor of the mother. In Ullman v. Ullman,20 the
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, expressed this new
preference. It stated that "[t]he child at tender age is entitled to have
such care, love, and discipline as only a good and devoted mother can
usually give. ,21
Since the later part of the nineteenth century, the courts in the
United States have started to express the notion that the predominant
factor in deciding custody is the best interests of the child. It is generally
accepted that the best interests of the child standard was formulated in
17. Lewis Kapner, Joint Custody and Shared ParentalResponsibility:An Examination of
Approaches in Wisconsin and Florida, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 673, 679 (1983). There is no
absolute ending date for the presumption in favor of the father. The process appears to be
more of a slow evolution rather than precise date. Thus, throughout this Article, citations to
different cases will reflect the various presumptions still in effect in one location while a
different location may have evolved into the next stage.
18. 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
19. Kapner, supra note 17, at 679-80 (alterations in original) (quoting Chapsky v. Wood,
26 Kan. 650, 652 (1881)); see also Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203, 205
(1834) (noting that while the good of the child is the predominant consideration, "the Court
will feel bound to restore the custody, where the law has placed it, with the father, unless in a
clear and strong case of unfitness on his part to have such custody").
20. 135 N.Y.S. 1080 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
21. Id. at 1083.
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two separate cases.? As indicated above, in the case of Chapsky v.
Wood,' the Kansas Supreme Court clearly articulated the "father
oriented" standard that prevailed at that time. Nevertheless, that court
rejected the view that parent's rights were the most important focus in a
custody dispute and indicated that the best interests of the child were
the proper focus.24 Justice Brewer wrote the opinion of the courte prior
to his appointment to the United States Supreme Court. In 1925, Judge
Cardozo reiterated this position:
The chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction upon petition does
not proceed upon the theory that the petitioner, whether father
or mother, has a cause of action against the other or indeed
against any one. He acts as parenspatrice to do what is best for
the interest of the child.?
The influence of the best interests of the child standard continued to
grow in prominence throughout the United States as the twentieth
century progressed. However, it was not until the presumption favoring
the mother was subsumed that the child's best interests became the
exclusive focus. Currently, most states have statutes that either
specifically require a determination of the child's best interests by the
family court or have a case law based analysis focused on the child's
needs and welfare?
B. Wisconsin
The common law view favoring the father also prevailed in the State
of Wisconsin and is evidenced by the statements of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in the case of In re Stillman Goodenough. In
Goodenough, the court reiterated the prevailing custodial rule: "[T]he
father has a legal and paramount right to the custody and services of his

22. See Ralph J. Podell et al., Custody-To Which Parent?,56 MARQ. L. REV. 51, 51-52
(1972) (noting that the best interest standard was formulated by Justice Brewer in Chapsky,
26 Kan. 650 and by Justice Cardozo in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429 (1925)).
23. 26 Kan. 650.
24. Id at 652.
25. Id. at 654.
26. Finlay,240 N.Y. at 433.
27. Robert Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminancy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226,236-37 nn.45-47 (1975).
28. 19 Wis. 274 (1865).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[85:929

child."29 In fact, the Wisconsin statutory scheme governing placement of
children in divorce situations reflected this common law view. That
statute indicated:
The father of the minor, if living, and in case of his decease, the
mother, while she remains unmarried, being themselves
respectively competent to transact their own business, and not
otherwise unsuitable, shall be entitled to the custody of the
person of the minor, and to the care of his education.?
This language was essentially in effect from 1849 through 1921."' In
1921, the Wisconsin statutory presumption favoring the father was
eliminated.
Despite the statutory presumption in favor of the father, in the late
nineteenth century, a new and contrary presumption began to develop
in the case law. This presumption, often called the tender years
presumption or the mother's love preference, started to develop in the
M the tilt of the
last decade of the 1800s.33 In Johnston v. Johnston,
balance toward the maternal preference is evidenced. "Strong natural
affection of a devoted mother living an industrious and reputable life,
though she be in straitened circumstances, is a very sufficient assurance
that she will tenderly care for and properly nurture and educate her
children."3 This presumption seemed to hit its zenith in Jenkins v.
Jenkins.36 In that case, the court stated:

29. Id.
30. 1858 Wis. Laws ch. 112, § 5.
31. Ronald R. Hofer, Comment, The Best Interest of the Child Doctrine in Wisconsin
Custody Cases, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 343,345 (1980).
32. When determining custody, section 3964 of the Wisconsin Session Laws in 1921
indicated that the court should consider:
The father and mother of the minor, if living together, and if living apart then either
as the court may determine for the best interests of the minor, and in case of the
death of either parent the survivor thereof, being themselves respectively competent
to transact their own business and not otherwise unsuitable, shall be entitled to the
custody of the person of the minor, and to the care of his education.
1921 Wis. Laws § 3964.
33. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
34. 89 Wis. 416, 62 N.W. 181 (1895).
35. Id. at 420, 62 N.W. at 182.
36. 173 Wis. 592, 181 N.W. 826 (1921).
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For a boy of such tender years nothing can be an adequate
substitute for mother love-for that constant ministration
required during the period of nurture that only a mother can give
because in her alone is duty swallowed up in desire; in her alone
is service expressed in terms of love. She alone has the patience
and sympathy required to mold and soothe the infant mind in its
adjustment to its environment.
The difference between
fatherhood and motherhood in this respect is fundamental and
the law should recognize it unless offset by undesirable traits in
the mother. Here we have none so far as mother love is
concerned.'
However, this preference for the mother never reached the level of a
statutory requirement."
Rather, the tender years doctrine simply
remained a case law guideline." In fact, between 1921 and 1971, the
Wisconsin statutory scheme regarding custody after divorce simply
indicated that the "court may make such further provisions therein as it
deems just and reasonable concerning the care, custody, maintenance
and education of the minor children .... 40
While the beginning of the best interests of the child standard is
frequently traced to the statements of Mr. Justice Brewer in Chapsky
and Judge Cardozo in Finlay, in the State of Wisconsin there were
suggestions that the best interests of the child standard was being
formulated as early as 1873.41

In the case of Welch v. Welch,42 the

Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated that "[t]he welfare of the children,
and how their interests will be best subserved, are the matters of
primary consideration with the court; and whatever order is made
respecting the care and custody of them, these [factors] should
constitute the governing motives of judicial action. ",43 Nevertheless, the

Welch court went on to reiterate the paternal preference that "[i]n
general, all other circumstances being equal, the paramount common
law right of the father to the children will be recognized. 44
Like the tender years presumption, the best interests of the child
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 592,181 N.W. at 827.
See Hofer, supra note 31, at 349.
Id.
1969 Wis. Laws. § 247.24.
See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
33 Wis. 534 (1873).
Id at 542.
Id at 541.
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standard started out as a case law guideline rather than as a statutory
scheme.45 In 1971, section 247.24 of the Wisconsin Code (the precursor
to the current chapter 767) was amended to codify the best interests of
the child standard and to specifically overturn the preference in favor of
either parent based upon sex.46 The new scheme indicated that "[i]n
determining the parent with whom a child shall remain, the court shall
consider all facts in the best interests of the child and shall not prefer
'
one parent over the other solely on the basis of the sex of the parent.' 4
C. Minnesota

In the State of Minnesota, developments in child custody laws
proceeded in a similar fashion to that of its neighboring State of
Wisconsin. The common law presumptions, adopted from this country's
English heritage, also prevailed in Minnesota's early custody laws. The
case of State ex rel. Flint v. Flint" illustrates the competing trends that
developed in the late nineteenth century in Minnesota. At that time,
Minnesota's statutory scheme, like Wisconsin's, provided for a father's
paramount right to custody of his children. In Flint, Justice William
Mitchell noted:
Now, while, under our statutes, the father is given the right to the
custody of his minor children, yet this right is not an absolute
legal right, beyond the control of the courts. The cardinal
principle in such matters is to regard the benefit of the infant
paramount to the claims of either parent. While the courts will
not lightly interfere with what may be termed the "natural
rights" of parents, yet the primary object of all courts, at least in
America, is to secure the welfare of the child, and not the special
claims of one or the other parent.
While Justice Mitchell suggested that in America the primary object
of custody laws was to "secure the welfare of the child,"51 one
commentator noted that decisions from the late nineteenth century
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See Hofer, supra note 31, at 349.
1971 Wis. Laws § 247.24(3).
Id.
65 N.W. 272 (Minn. 1895).
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id
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"through the early twentieth century referred to, although often failed
to adhere to, the 'best interests of the child' principle."52
When surveying Minnesota case law from the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, this view of the precedent appears to be true.
In fact, as in Wisconsin, it was under the guise of applying the best
interests of the child standard that the preference for the mother came
into existence.' This can be clearly seen in the Minnesota Supreme
Court case of Christianson v. Christianson.m In that case, the court

addressed a post-judgment motion to modify the placement of a tenyear-old girl." The court noted that "[t]he rule is well settled that the
welfare of the child is the prime consideration in determining to whom
its custody shall be given."5 Nevertheless, despite voicing adherence to
this principle, the court went on to note that "[o]rdinarily, a child of
tender years should have the care, love, and affection of its mother...
because for these, under normal circumstances, there is no adequate
substitute. ' The court affirmed the trial court's order denying the
mother's motion to grant her request for physical custody of the child. 8
The court, however, entered that order based upon the finding that
"even a mother's care, love, and affection must yield to the child's
welfare, and where it appears, as here, that the mother's care and
custody will be detrimental to the welfare of the child, she should not be
awarded its custody."59 Thus, the supreme court indicated that the
child's best interests are paramount, but it was prepared to apply the
presumption favoring the mother, barring evidence showing that the
application of the presumption would be detrimental to the child. This
preference prevailed in the State of Minnesota into the late 1960s.
In 1969, the Minnesota legislature revised the state's custody statute

52. See Ahl, supra note 12, at 1348.
53. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child. Reexamining Child
Custody Standard-Settingin the Wake of Minnesota'sFour Year Experiment with the Primary
Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 433 (1990) ("Early in the twentieth century,
most courts adopted a new parental preference derived from the child's best interests. This
preference, the tender years doctrine, presumed that children of tender years should be in the
custody of their mother.").
54. 15 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 1944).
55. Id.at25.
56. Id. (citing State ex rel.Peterson v. Sanders, 10 N.W.2d 387,388 (Minn. 1943)).
57. Id at 26 (citing Spratt v. Spratt, 187 N.W. 227,229 (Minn. 1922)).
58. Id. at 24.
59. Id
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by codifying the best interests of the child standard.' In addition, it
mandated that "[in determining the parent with whom a child shall
remain, the court shall consider all facts in the best interests of the
children and shall not prefer one parent over the other solely on the
basis of the sex of the parent."61 By 1974, the Minnesota legislature
deleted the vestige of sex as a factor in placement disputes. 2 Language
was deleted from the statute which allowed the courts to give "due
regard to the age and sex of... [the] children."63 In the case of Erickson
v. Erickson,64 the Minnesota Supreme Court verified that the
presumption favoring mothers in custody disputes was dead. The court

noted that in a custody dispute, "the mother should not be given an
absolute or arbitrary preference in the custody of young children."6
Thus, by the mid 1970s, both Wisconsin and Minnesota had statutory

language preventing family court judges from preferring either parent
simply on the basis of sex. Both states now had statutes that were pure

best interests of the child statutes rather than statutes that were laboring
under a tender years presumption.
II. CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEMES
Divorce affects a large number of Wisconsin and Minnesota
residents.' As a result, a large number of children are affected by the

60. 1969 Minn. Laws 1030.
61. Id. (emphasis omitted).
62. 1974 Minn. Laws 330.
63. Id.
64. 220 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 1974).
65. Id at 489.
66. According to the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, in 2000
there were 17,388 divorces in the State of Wisconsin. See DEPT. OF HEALTH & FAMILY
SERV., WIS. MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES 1999, at 12 (Aug. 2000), available at
http://www.dhfs.state.wi.uslstatslmarriages.htm. Of those divorces, fifty-five percent involved
families with children under the age of eighteen. Id. Among those divorces that affected
families with children, an average of 1.8 children were affected by each of those divorces. Id.
According to the Minnesota Department of Health, in 2000 there were 15,895 divorces in
the State of Minnesota. See MINN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, 1999 MINNESOTA HEALTH
STATISTICS ANNUAL SUMMARY (Feb. 2001), available at http:llwww.health.state.mn.us/
divs/chs/99annsumdivorce.pdf. In 1998, there were 15,165 divorces in the State of Minnesota.
Interview with Department of Health and Family Services (June 8, 2000). Of those divorces,
6316 involved children, 4822 involved no children, and 4027 did not fully complete the
statistical form. Id. This is the most current data available from Minnesota because
according to an official at the Minnesota Department of Health and Family Services, they no
longer maintain statistics on the number of children involved in divorces.
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family court systems of these two states.67 The statutory schemes for
legal custody and physical custody in both Wisconsine and Minnesota69
require that such determinations by a court be based upon the best

interests of the child. In Wisconsin, this requirement is codified in
section 767.24 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which indicates that:
In determining legal custody and periods of physical placement,
the court shall consider all facts relevant to the best interest of
the child. The court may not prefer one parent or potential
the basis of the sex or race of the
custodian over the other on 70
parent or potential custodian.
67. See supra note 66.
68. The Wisconsin Family Code uses the terms "legal custody" and "physical
placement" when addressing the living arrangements of a child and the decision-making
arrangements regarding the child. "Legal custody" is defined as "the right and responsibility
to make major decisions concerning the child, except with respect to specified decisions as set
forth by the court or the parties in the final judgment or order." Wis. STAT. § 767.001(2)
(1999-2000). The term "physical placement" is defined as: "the condition under which a
party has the right to have a child physically placed with that party and has the right and
responsibility to make, during that placement, routine daily decisions regarding the child's
care, consistent with major decisions made by a person having legal custody." Id. §
767.001(5).
69. The Minnesota Family Code uses the terms "legal custody" and "physical custody"
when addressing the living arrangements of a child and the decision-making arrangements
regarding the child. "Legal custody" is defined as "the right to determine the child's
upbringing, including education, health care, and religious training." MINN. STAT. ANN. §
518.003(3)(a) (West. Supp. 2002).
The term "physical custody and residence" is defined as "the routine daily care and
control and the residence of the child." Id. § 518.003(3)(c).
70. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(5). A complete list of the factors enumerated in section
767.24(5) is as follows:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents, as shown by any stipulation
between the parties, any proposed parenting plan or any legal custody or physical
placement proposal submitted to the court at trial.
(b) The wishes of the child, which may be communicated by the child or
through the child's guardian ad litem or other appropriate professional.
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or
parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest.
(cm) The amount and quality of time that each parent has spent with the child
in the past... and any reasonable life-style changes that a parent proposes to make
to be able to spend time with the child in the future.
(d) The child's adjustment to the home, school, religion and community.
(dm) The age of the child and the child's developmental and educational needs
at different ages.
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In Minnesota, this standard is set forth in section 518.17 of the
Minnesota Statutes, which indicates that "[i]n determining custody, the

court shall consider the best interests of each child and shall not prefer
one parent over the other solely on the basis of the sex of the parent. 71
(e) The mental and physical health of the parties, the minor children and other
persons living in a proposed custodial household.
(em) The need for regularly occurring and meaningful periods of physical
placement to provide predictability and stability for the child.
(f) The availability of public or private child care services.
(fin) The cooperation and communication between the parties and whether
either party unreasonably refuses to cooperate or communicate with the other party.
(g) Whether each party can support the other party's relationship with the child,
including encouraging and facilitating frequent and continuing contact with the
child, or whether one party is likely to unreasonably interfere with the child's
continuing relationship with the other party.
(h) Whether there is evidence that a party engaged in abuse, as defined in s.
813.122(1)(a), of the child, as defined in s. 48.02(2).
(i) Whether there is evidence of interspousal battery as described under s.
940.19 or 940.20(lm) or domestic abuse as defined in s. 813.12(1)(a).
(j) Whether either party has or had a significant problem with alcohol or drug
abuse.
(jm) The reports of appropriate professionals if admitted into evidence.
(k) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be
relevant.
WIs. STAT. § 967.24(5).
71. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(3)(a)(3). A complete list of the factors enumerated in §
518.17(1)(a) is as follows:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
(2) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient age to express preference;
(3) the child's primary caretaker;
(4) the intimacy of the relationship between each parent and the child;
(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parent or parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests;
(6) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(7) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment
and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(8) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home;
(9) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; except that a
disability, as defined in section 363.01, of a proposed custodian or the child shall not
be determinative of the custody of the child, unless the proposed custodial
arrangement is not in the best interest of the child;
(10) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child, love, affection,
and guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child in the child's culture
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Minnesota also has a separate set of factors for the court to consider
when contemplating an award of joint custody. 2
Wisconsin and Minnesota have experienced developments in their
respective child custody and physical placement laws over the last
several years that have had a dramatic impact on the way courts in both
of those states decide the living arrangements for children of divorce. In
fact, sweeping changes have been attempted in both Wisconsin and
Minnesota within the last two years.73 While some of those attempts
have been successful and others unsuccessful, the attempts at change in
both states, in and of themselves, are very revealing about the trends in
child custody theory in our society.
A. Wisconsin

On October 6, 1999, the Wisconsin legislature passed a budget bill
and religion or creed, if any;
(11) the child's cultural background;
(12) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if related to domestic
abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, that has occurred between the parents or
between a parent and another individual, whether or not the individual alleged to
have committed domestic abuse is or ever was a family or household member of the
parent; and
(13) except in cases in which a finding of domestic abuse as defined in section
518B.01 has been made, the disposition of each parent to encourage and permit
frequent and continuing contact by the other parent with the child.
The court may not use one factor to the exclusion of all others. The primary
caretaker factor may not be used as a presumption in determining the best interests
of the child. The court must make detailed findings on each of the factors and
explain how the factors led to its conclusions and to the determination of the best
interests of the child.
Id. § 518.17(1)(a).
72. Section 518.17(2) of the Minnesota Statutes specifies:
In addition to the factors listed in subdivision 1, where either joint legal or joint
physical custody is contemplated or sought, the court shall consider the following
relevant factors:
(a) The ability of parents to cooperate in the rearing of their children;
(b) Methods for resolving disputes regarding any major decision concerning the
life of the child, and the parents' willingness to use those methods;
(c) Whether it would be detrimental to the child if one parent were to have sole
authority over the child's upbringing; and
(d) Whether domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has occurred
between the parents.
Id. § 518.17(2).
73. See infra Part lI.A-B.
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for the state that made several changes to the existing child custody and
placement statutes.74 The child custody and placement language was
based upon a bill commonly called the "Gary George Bill., 75 Wisconsin
State Senator Gary George had introduced legislation affecting custody
and placement in previous years and his attempt in 1999 was to include
the language of Senate Bill 107 in the budget bill." The legislation had a
number of parts. First, it proposed to eliminate the best interests of the
child standard in the State of Wisconsin.' It did so by creating a
rebuttable presumption in favor of joint or equal placement of
children. 7' The legislation also proposed to eliminate the role of the
guardian ad litem in the family courts of the state. 79 "Fathers groups,"
who believed that all too often fathers did not get a fair shake in family
court custody disputes, spurred the legislation." Their concerns reached
sympathetic ears with Wisconsin Governor Tommy G. Thompson who
proclaimed June 13, 1999 through June 19, 1999 as "Wisconsin
Fatherhood Week."'" The proclamation indicated that "the State of
Wisconsin is committing itself to more actively involving fathers in the
lives of their children through the Wisconsin Fatherhood Initiative and
calling on all state agencies to make themselves more father friendly. 'n
The legislation
had some powerful backers and a real chance of
83
success.

The Wisconsin State Bar Association Family Law Section lobbied
against Senate Bill 1074 as did other groups. 5 Ultimately, the coalition
74. Christopher Walther, HistoricalNotes on Wisconsin's New Custody, Placement and
PaternityReform Legislation,20 Wis. J.FAM. L. 34 (2000).
75. Id.
76. I&
77. Id
78. Id.
79. Id.; See also Gregg Herman, Budget Brings Myriad Family Law Changes, WIS.
OPINIONS, Nov. 10, 1999, at 6.
80. Herman, supra note 79, at 6.
81. Walther, supra note 74, at 35.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 34-35 (noting that the Family Law Section of the Wisconsin Bar
Association "had been warned by its lobbyists, and various members of the legislature, that
major custody legislation would be included in the state budget, and politically there was a
reasonable chance that Senate Bill 107 would be enacted into law").
84. Id. at 34.
85. Jane Pribek, Family Law Portion of Budget Bill Seeks to Improve Status Quo, 13
WIS. OPINIONS, Oct. 20, 1999, 1, at 8 (noting that the introduction of Senate Bill 107 by
Senator George brought the Family Law Section, the state's family court commissioners,
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which formed against the Gary George Bill was successful in making

changes to the legislation that was eventually passed and signed into law
by Governor Thompson on October 28, 1999." Among the various and
final changes that were made to the Wisconsin Family Code were
additional factors that judges must consider in making custody and
placement decisions. Those additional factors include: (1) "The amount

and quality of time that each parent has spent with the child in the
past... and any reasonable life-style changes that a parent proposes to
make to be able to spend time with the child in the future.""' (2) "The
age of the child and the child's developmental and educational needs at
different ages."" (3) "The need for regularly occurring and meaningful

periods of physical placement to provide predictability and stability for
the child."89 (4) "The cooperation and communication between the

parties and whether either party unreasonably refuses to cooperate or
communicate with the other party." 0 (5) "Whether each party can
support the other party's relationship with the child, including
encouraging and facilitating frequent and continuing contact with the
child, or whether one party is likely to unreasonably interfere with the

child's continuing relationship with the other party."9' (6) "The reports
of appropriate professionals if admitted into evidence. "9
These additional factors were not the only changes made to the
Wisconsin Family Code as of May 1, 2000." However, these additions to
parents groups and some domestic violence prevention advocates together in order to come
up with alternatives).
86. Christopher D. Walther, Wisconsin's Custody, Placement, and Paternity Reform
Legislation,73 Wis. LAW., Apr. 2000, at 15,19.
87. Wis. STAT. §767.24(5)(cm) (1999-2000).
88. Id. § 767.24(5)(dm).
89. Id. § 767.24(5)(em).
90. Id. § 767.24(5)(fm).
91. Id. § 767.24(5)(g). Section 767.24(5)(g) had formerly stated that the court would
consider "[w]hether one party is likely to unreasonably interfere with the child's continuing
relationship with the other party." WIS. STAT. § 767.24(5)(g) (1995-1996).
92. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(5)(jm) (1999-2000). Prior to this factor being set forth in
section 767.24(5)(jm), it was part of the preamble to the entire subsection 767.24(5) of the
Wisconsin statutes. Id.
93. There have been other significant changes to the Wisconsin Family Law Code.
These changes include: 1) When there is a contest for legal custody or physical placement, a
parent "shall file a parenting plan with the court before any pretrial conference." WIS. STAT.
§ 767.24(lm) (see infra note 181 for required components of the parenting plan). 2) The court
must seek to set a placement schedule that "maximizes the amount of time the child may
spend with each parent, taking into account geographic separation and accommodations for

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[85:929

section 767.24(5) complete the list of factors to be considered by courts

in Wisconsin custody and placement cases.
For purposes of analysis, these "custodial factors" can be grouped
into four broad categories. 94 These broad categories of factors include:
(1) factors that analyze the wishes of the parents and the child; (2)

factors that analyze the stability and consistency of the parents'
relationship with the child; (3) factors that focus on the physical and
mental health of the parties and the children; and (4) factors that look at
the behaviors of each party.95
The first custodial category would include those factors relating to

the wishes of the parents and the child. In Wisconsin, the wishes of the
parents are demonstrated by any stipulation that they may have reached
or any proposals that they may submit to the court," including a
parenting plan submitted to the court at the divorce pretrial pursuant to
different households." Id. § 767.24(4)(a)(2). The court shall consider the factors in section
767.24(5) when making this determination. Id. 3) When determining placement for the child,
"[t]he court shall presume that joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child." Id.
§ 767.24(2)(am). 4) Under most circumstances, in a paternity action, child support can only
be retroactive to the date of filing the paternity petition. Id. § 767.51(4). 5) Parents who have
been denied periods of placement by the other party have remedies available to them,
including an injunction entered by a judge or family court commissioner ordering the
offending party to strictly comply with the placement schedule. Id. § 767.242. 6) The court is
not required to appoint a guardian ad litem if the court finds inter alia that a guardian ad
litem "will not assist the court in the determination regarding legal custody and physical
placement." Id. § 767.045(1)(am)(3)(a). 7) A provision was passed and signed into law which
directs that a committee be formed to study reformation of the guardian ad litem system. Act
of Oct. 27, 1999, No. 9, § 9157(4y), 1999 Wis. Law 15, 733.
94. See MARC J. ACKERMAN & ANDREW W. KANE, PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERTS IN
DIVORCE ACTIONS 156-57 (3d. ed. 1998) (citing American Psychological Association,
Guidelinesfor Child Custody Evaluationsin Divorce Proceedings). Ackerman and Kane note
that custody and placement analysis for psychologists is generally focused on four broad
areas:
(1) the adult's capacity for parenting; (2) the psychological functioning and
developmental needs of the child, and the wishes of each child, when appropriate;
(3) the functioning ability of each parent to meet these standards; and (4) the
interaction between each adult and each child.
Id. at 157. They also opine that these broad categories are closely aligned with the factors set
forth in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of 1979 (UMDA). Id. at 158. This Act was
passed by Congress in 1979 and has been used as a model for custody and placement statutes
in many states. Id. The four "custodial categories" set forth in this Article are based upon
those set forth in the UMDA and the Ackerman and Kane study.
95. Id. at 157.
96. An effort to create a legal presumption of the child's best interests in any stipulation
between the two parties that is submitted to the court regarding legal custody and physical
placement failed to make it into the 1999 budget bill. See Pribek, supra note 85, at 8.
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section 767.24(lm) of the Wisconsin Statutes." Obviously, the wishes of
the parents are of very little use in resolving a contested custody dispute
in a divorce setting because if the parents did not have different views
on the matter there would be no dispute."8 Nevertheless, Wisconsin

seeks to have each parent set forth in writing an actual proposal
outlining their vision of the custody arrangement. 9 The use of these

parenting plans is a new requirement of the Wisconsin Family Code, the
purpose of which is to "get people to think about what they're asking
for, and to get them off of 'I want equal rights.'"'"0 In addition to the
parent's wishes, the wishes of the child have been a factor in custody
disputes for quite some time.' 1 While there appears to be some
misconception that a child who is the subject of a custody dispute can, at
a given age, make a choice about where to live and have a judge
obligated to follow that choice, there is no such magic age." Rather, a
child's input is merely considered by the court as one factor and only if
the child is "sufficiently mature to be able to formulate and express a
rational opinion and desire as to its custody"'0' Furthermore, the mere
preference of a child is not controlling unless the child can give
substantial reasons why it would be in his or her best interests to have
the court follow such an expressed preference.'f 4 This means, of course,
that a mature eight-year-old might have some influence on his or her
placement arrangement while an immature sixteen-year-old may not."
97. WIS. STAT. § 767.24(lm).
98. Furthermore, the mere fact that the wishes of a parent are included as a factor in the
custody and placement provisions of section 767.24 does not create an absolute right of a fit
and able parent to custody of his or her children in the face of compelling reasons to the
contrary. Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis.2d 479,568-69,348 N.W.2d 479,489 (1984).
99. WIs. STAT. § 767.24(lm).
100. See Pribek, supra note 85, at 8 (quoting an interview with Milwaukee Family Court
Commissioner, Lucy Cooper).
101. There is no particular method by which the court must inform itself of the wishes of
a child. Hughes v. Hughes, 223 Wis. 2d 111, 131, 588 N.W.2d 346, 355 (Ct. App. 1998). The
various methods could include in camera interviews by the court, statements through the
guardian ad litem or other professional, and testimony from the child. See id. at 131-33, 588
N.W.2d at 355-56.
102. See WIS. STAT. § 880.09(1) (noting that, under certain circumstances, a minor over
the age of 14 years may nominate his or her own guardian).
103. State ex rel.Hannon v. Eisler, 270 Wis. 469,482, 71 N.W.2d 376,384 (1955).
104. Haugen v. Haugen, 82 Wis. 2d 411,417,262 N.W.2d 769,772 (1978).
105. One survey of psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers found that the mean
age at which such professionals believe children should be allowed to choose the parent with
whom they live is 15.1 years old. Marc J. Ackerman & Melissa C. Ackerman, Custody
Evaluation Practices:A Survey of Experienced Professionals (Revisited), PROF. PSYCHOL.:
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The ultimate determination of how much weight to give the children's

desires is left to the court.
Several of the factors set forth in section 767.24(5) are specifically
directed toward maintaining stability and consistency in a child's life-a
goal of undeniable merit. For example, the court must consider "[t]he
interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or
parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interest."'06 In addition, while Minnesota requires the courts
to look at which parent was the child's primary caretaker"'Y Wisconsin

requires the court to consider the similar notion of "[t]he amount and
quality of time that each parent has spent with the child in the past. "'0
The court must also look at "[t]he child's adjustment to the home,
school, religion and community."'10 The newly added custodial factor of
"[t]he need for regularly occurring and meaningful periods of physical
placement to provide predictability and stability for the child"' 0 must
also be addressed by the court. Included in the analysis of this factor
would be the very practical and very important issue of the parent's
work schedule. In a custody dispute between two parents of equal
caliber, the work schedule of each party often produces the definitive
answer to the placement schedule. Thus, if a parent is not available
because of work, they can not have the child. While this is a new

RES. & PRAC., April 1997, at 137, 144.
106. WIS. STAT. § 767.24(5)(c). For a more in-depth discussion of the extent to which
third party relationships may affect a placement arrangement, see Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis.
2d 549, 348 N.W.2d 479 (1984). The Barstadcase involved a dispute over children between a
parent and a relative, with whom the parent and child had been residing. Id. at 551-53, 348
N.W.2d at 480-81. The court noted that "[a] biological parent who has never borne any
significant responsibility for the child and who has not functioned as a member of the child's
family unit is not entitled to the full constitutional protections [accorded a parent]." Id. at
563, 348 N.W.2d at 486.
107. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(3) (West Supp. 2002); see also infra note 14148 and accompanying text.
108. WIS. STAT. § 767.24(5)(cm). Again, the case of Barstad sheds further light on the
way in which this factor is applied. The case suggests that a child will not necessarily be
placed with a parent who has not given that child any significant amount of time.
109. Id. § 767.24(5)(d); see also Welker v. Welker, 24 Wis.2d 570, 576, 129 N.W.2d 134,
138 (1964) (noting that the court's inquiry into religious issues is limited to whether a
prospective custodian has religious views which might reasonably be considered dangerous to
the health or morals of the child).
110. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(5)(em). While this factor ostensibly seeks to provide
"predictability and stability for the child," evidence that one parent has been uninvolved with
the day-to-day care of the child may result, upon application of this statutory factor, in
significant change and short term instability in the life of a child.
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custodial factor in the State of Wisconsin, it is not without some
precedent in the court system. In the divorce case of Patrick v.
Patrick,"' the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that "[m]inor children
are entitled to the love and companionship of both parents insofar as
this is possible and consistent with their welfare."112 All of these stability
and consistency factors suggest that trial courts need to consider the
pattern that was set up for the child during the course of the marriage
and determine whether any adverse affect might result from disrupting
that pattern.l While stability and consistency have undeniable merit, a
question arises as to whether it is even possible to continue a consistent
pattern after the dissolution of the marriage, given the changes that are
bound to occur. Thus, the goal that is the focus of this custodial
category may be illusory.
There are several factors that essentially direct trial courts to focus
on the physical and mental health of the parties and the child.
Certainly, psychological evaluations of parties to a divorce action are
not uncommon. In fact, those evaluations often involve at least an
interview with the child to assist in evaluating the specific needs of the
child. "' 5 Thus, the court must consider "[t]he mental and physical health
of the parties, the minor children and other persons living in a proposed
custodial household." '16 In addition, "[t]he age of the child and the
child's developmental and educational needs at different ages"" 7 must
specifically enter into the court's deliberations. Opinions about the
needs of children at different ages and about a particular child's
developmental needs are generally helpful to the court. Further, courts
usually require the expert opinion of a psychologist or trained
counselor, which can come at a very high economic cost to the parties.
111. 17 Wis. 2d 434,117 N.W.2d 256 (1962).
112. Id. at 439, 117 N.W.2d at 259 (quoting Block v. Block, 15 Wis.2d 291, 298, 112
N.W.2d 923,927 (1961)).
113. The court must also consider the availability of day care arrangements, which may
also play into the consistency factors if a child is already established in a given day care
facility. WIs. STAT. § 767.24(5)(f).
114. Section 767.24(5)(jm) permits that court to evaluate "[t]he reports of appropriate
professionals if admitted into evidence." Id This factor used to be contained in the preamble
of section 767.24(5) of the Wisconsin Statutes, but was designated as a separate factor as of
May 1, 2000. Id.
115. See ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 94, at 159-60.
116. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(5)(e).
117. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(5)(dm). For a more complete discussion on the different needs
of each age group of children in divorce situations, see ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 94,
at 223-28.
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In the end, courts will generally not inquire into the mental health issues
unless some evidence is brought forth suggesting that a problem exists.
The fourth custodial category, which looks at the behavior of each
party, is similar to these psychological factors.
Behavioral
considerations include such factors as the "cooperation and
communication between the parties and whether either party
unreasonably refuses to cooperate or communicate with the other
party ' and "[w]hether each party can support the other party's
relationship with the child,... or whether one party is likely to
unreasonably interfere with the child's continuing relationship with the
other party."'19 These two factors, when looked at in conjunction with
the new injunction provisions that were added to the Wisconsin Family
Code, 2° suggest that the legislature wants to crack down on parents who
intentionally create problems for the other parent either by failing to
communicate or by communicating in a harmful way. Additional
considerations when assessing the behavior of a parent include
"[w]hether either party has or had a significant problem with alcohol or
drug abuse"'2' and whether or not there is evidence that a party has
engaged in or engages in physical abuse of a child," interspousal
battery,' 23 or domestic abuse. 4
Of the additions to section 767.24 in the year 2000, at least three of
them seem to be focused on directing courts toward joint physical
placement arrangements. For example, the notion of setting "a
placement schedule that allows the child to have regularly occurring,
meaningful periods of physical placement with each parent and that
maximizes the amount of time the child may spend with each parent"'"

118. WIs. STAT. §767.24(5)(fm).
119. Id. § 767.24(5)(g).
120. See id. § 767.242; see also supra note 93.
121. WIS. STAT. § 767.24(5)(j). Minnesota does not have a similar factor relating to
drugs and alcohol in its statutory scheme.
122. Id. § 767.24(5)(h). See Neblett v. Neblett, 274 Wis. 574, 578, 81 N.W.2d 61, 63
(1957) (holding that a father who had imposed a sadistic type of punishment on the children
and had treated them in a harsh and violent manner was not entitled to have the care and
custody of the children nor was he entitled to have visitation with the children).
123. WIS. STAT. § 767.24(5)(i). See Bertram v. Kilian, 133 Wis. 2d 202, 204-05, 394
N.W.2d 773,774 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the husband's violent conduct toward the wife
was sufficient justification to award the children to the wife despite the wife's failure to show
that the violence affected the children).
124. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(5)(i).
125. Id. § 767.24(4)(a)(2).
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suggests that a court will need to consider a placement arrangement that
is substantially equal. Further, the statute identifies that "[t]he need for
regularly occurring and meaningful periods of physical placement""
must be a factor the court considers in placement decisions, which
suggests that there may be a given schedule that does not provide a
parent with meaningful periods of placement. "[T]he amount and
quality of time that each parent has spent with the child in the past...
and any necessary life-style changes that a parent proposes to make to
be able to spend time with the child in the future"127 raises images of a
father from a more traditional family arrangement, where he was the
bread winner and the mother stayed at home, coming into a divorce
court and trying to argue that he should not be prejudiced because he
agreed to work outside the home. Despite changes in the societal roles
of men and women, this is not an uncommon sequence of events.
The fact that some of these additions to the Wisconsin Family Code
direct a court toward joint placement should not, however, be surprising
to anyone given that the genesis of these factors was the Gary George
Bill, which originally recommended a legal presumption in favor of joint
placement.'2 Nevertheless, it is just that genesis which should be cause
for concern in the State of Wisconsin. Senate Bill 107 was not the first
time that Senator George attempted to pursue such a presumption,'29
and the mere fact that the legislature requires courts to specifically look
at same-time arrangements suggests that such a presumption could
surface again.
B. Minnesota

Minnesota's child custody statutory scheme is very similar to
Wisconsin's in that the Minnesota courts are also required to consider
certain factors based upon the best interests of the child when entering a
placement order.'30 Minnesota has thirteen such factors, and similar to
the Wisconsin custodial factors, the Minnesota custodial factors fit
loosely into the four broad custodial categories outlined above.
The first category of factors includes those that seek to evaluate the
wishes of the parents and the wishes of the child. As with the State of
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. § 767.24(5)(em).
Id. § 767.24(5)(cm).
See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
See Walther, supra note 74, at 34.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a) (West Supp. 2002).
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Wisconsin, Minnesota looks to the wishes of the child's parents as a
factor in any physical custody arrangement. 3 ' Again, looking to the
wishes of each parent is of limited use in a custody dispute during a
divorce because there would likely not be a custody dispute if the
parents were in agreement. Minnesota does not have a mandatory
parenting plan requirement similar to the one set forth in section
767.24(lm) of the Wisconsin Statutes. It does, however, have a
voluntary parenting plan statute which, under certain circumstances,
could be utilized to communicate the wishes of the parent.' The only
requirement for a parenting plan in the State of Minnesota arises when a
parent seeking physical custody or visitation has been convicted of
certain specified criminal offenses.'
The wishes of the child must be considered by Minnesota courts just
as in Wisconsin. 4 The preference of a child can be considered at any
age, but Minnesota's statute provides more guidance than Wisconsin's

statute. The Minnesota statute indicates that the court may consider the
preference of a child "if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age
'
The Minnesota courts have noted that they
to express preference." 35
will respect the wishes of the child if the child's "decision is intelligently
made."'36 Obviously, this language leaves room for each party to argue
that the child is or is not of "sufficient age to express preference." The
courts will also address the question of whether the child was "coached"
in his or her preference." Nevertheless, courts have noted that this
factor does not permit the court to delegate the responsibility of setting
the appropriate visitation schedule to a child.'38 Wisconsin courts would,
of course, take a similar view, that children will not be put in a position
of being forced to choose between parents nor in a position of dictating
131. Id. § 518.17(1)(a)(1).
132. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
133. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.179.
134. Id. § 518.17(1)(a)(2).
135. Id.
136. State ex rel. Waslie v. Waslie, 152 N.W.2d 755,757 (Minn. 1967).
137. See Schwamb v. Schwamb, 395 N.W.2d 732,735 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that
the children's preferences were not reliable based upon a social workers finding that their
opinions had been "coached"); see also Sucher v. Sucher, 416 -N.W.2d 182, 185 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (noting that a child of seven years had not exhibited sufficient maturity and that it
appeared the father had "coached" the children before they were interviewed); Mowers v.
Mowers, 406 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that a child who was seven years
and ten months old was of sufficient age to express her preference and was not "coached"
regarding said preference).
138. Barrett v. Barrett, 394 N.W.2d 274,279 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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to the court the nature of a physical custody schedule. In Minnesota,
however, there is some precedent for a court at the trial level to follow a
child's wish to be placed with a non-parent over a biological parent.
That is, the Minnesota Supreme Court has specifically opined that a
child's wishes may, in certain circumstances, supersede the right of a
parent to have custody of his or her child.139 While that situation may
seem to place too much authority in the hands of children, it also
demonstrates that the parties can not ignore the thoughts of a child.
There are also several factors set forth in section 518.17 of the
Minnesota Statutes which direct trial courts to focus on maintaining
stability and consistency in a child's life.14 In this regard, the court must
look to "the child's adjustment to [the] home, school, and community"
in which the child is living.14 ' This is the same factor that exists in
Wisconsin with the exception that Wisconsin includes religion as part of
this factor. One significant problem with this requirement in both states
is that it places a great deal of emphasis on who gets the marital
residence in the final divorce. If a child has lived in a particular house
for-several years during the marriage, the parent who gets the house has
an advantage. Further, if the other parent relocates to a different school
district because of the need to leave the house, there is an additional
disadvantage. This factor can also have a-negative impact on a person

139. See In re Hohmann, 95 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 1959). In Hohmann, the Minnesota
Supreme Court addressed a dispute between a biological father and a step-father, where the
deceased mother had been granted physical custody in the divorce from the father. Id. at 645.
The court noted that "[a]lthough the right of a parent to the care and custody of his minor
child is paramount and superior to the right of a third person, that right must always yield to
the best interest of the child." Id. at 647. The court went on to state:
where children of sufficient maturity to express an intelligent opinion have a factual
basis for passing judgment on their surviving father's parental attitude, and have not
been wrongfully influenced by others, their definitely expressed desire not to be
transferred to the custody of their father is entitled to considerable weight in
determining whether it is wise to uproot them from their present custodial home.
Id. The court further stated that the standard to be used in determining the best interest of
the child in such cases is based upon the court's analysis of the prospect of "future right
treatment" and fidelity by the parent who has left his or her child to the care of others. Id. at
648. For a comparison with the standard used in Wisconsin, see Barstad v. Frazier,118 Wis.
2d 549,563-64,348 N.W.2d 479,486-87 (1986).
140. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17.
141. Id. § 518.17(1)(a)(6). See Petersen v. Petersen, 394 N.W.2d 586, 587-88 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (finding that even though both parents would provide stable environments for the
child, the fact that the mother would need to remove the children from the community and
school in which they were residing would tip the scale in favor of the father).
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who has been removed from the marital residence by a restraining order
or injunction just prior to the commencement of the divorce. Taking
this line of thinking to its logical conclusion, a physical custody dispute
could be concluded the moment one parent leaves the marital residence.
This, of course, leads to the often harmful advice from opposing counsel
to their clients that they must stay in the marital residence until the case

is over. The pressure and stress in the home, while difficult for parents,
can be an impossible situation for a child.

As additional stability and consistency custodial factors, the
Minnesota courts look to "the length of time the child has lived in a

stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining
continuity" in that environment.14 2 The Minnesota courts also look to

"the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home. 143 Wisconsin does not have these two factors in its statutory
scheme.

Nevertheless, avoiding insecurity in a child's life regarding

home, school, and community is an important part of keeping a child's
45
life stable after the finalization of a divorce.1 " In Petersen v. Petersen,'

the Minnesota Court of Appeals clearly applied these two factors in
affirming an award of custody to the father.146 The court noted that the

child had lived for three years with the father and his parents, both of
whom had provided the child with a stable environment.4 The court
also noted that the mother's living arrangements were less stable and
that by awarding the children to the mother, the children would be
required to change communities and change schools. 8
142. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(7); see also Regenscheid v. Regenscheid, 395
N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In Regenscheid, the court of appeals noted that the trial
court found that the mother "took more responsibility for cooking, cleaning, and laundering
clothes." Id. at 378. Nevertheless, the court looked with favor on the husband's "ability to
offer the boys continued emotional and psychological stability in their home, school and
community." Id. at 379-80. Despite the fact that the mother took primary responsibility for
the day-to-day care of the children, the court noted that "[t]he strong emotional bonding
between respondent and the boys in this case overcomes the presumption [that] the primary
caregiver is the parent who provides the most physical care." Id. at 379. The appellate court
stated that, based upon the above stated factors, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding custody of children to the father despite the mother's role in providing physical
care. Id.
143. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(8).
144. ACKERMAN & KANE,supra note 94, at 233-34.
145. 394 N.W.2d 586.
146. Id. at 588-89.
147. Id. at 587.
148. Id.
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In an effort to maintain stability and consistency in the bonds that a
child has with other individuals, Minnesota looks toward "the intimacy
' as well as the
of the relationship between each parent and the child"149
interaction that a child may have with "parents, siblings, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child's best interests."150 In the
case of Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld,"' the court noted that despite the fact
that both parents were concerned and loving parents, the mother should
receive physical custody because she had "provided the most continuity
of care and [had] the closest relationship with the [three-year-old
daughter]." ' n While Wisconsin does not have a factor focusing on the
intimacy of the parent-child relationship, it does have one that seeks to
inquire into the interaction of other people who may affect the child's
best interests.'
The factor that has recently been the focus of a great deal of debate
in Minnesota examines which parent has provided the most stability and
consistency in the child's life prior to the divorce. That factor is the
"primary caretaker" factor.'4 The Wisconsin Family Code does not
have a similarly worded factor in its statute, but Wisconsin's legislature
could learn a great deal from an analysis of Minnesota's experience with
the primary caretaker custodial factor. 55 The primary caretaker of a
child has been defined by Minnesota courts as the parent responsible for
the caring and nurturing duties of the child including:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and
dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes; (4) medical
care... ; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after
school ...; (6) arranging alternative care... ; (7) putting child to

bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking
child in the morning; (8) disciplining... ; (9) educating... ; and,
149. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(4) (West Supp. 2002).
150. Id. § 518.17(1)(a)(5). See Simonson v. Simonson, 292 N.W.2d 12, 13 (Minn. 1980)
(noting that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to award physical custody of a child
to "a mother who is cohabiting with a person who has a record of sexually molesting
children").
151. 249 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1976).
152. Id. at 172.
153. WIs. STAT. § 76724(5)(c) (1999-2000).
154. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(3).

155. The closest that the Wisconsin custodial factors get to a primary caretaker analysis
is the newly enacted mandate to look at the "amount and quality of time that each parent has
spent with the child in the past." WIs. STAT. § 767.24(5)(cm).
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Recognizing that there may be an extended period of time that the

parents are separated prior to the actual granting of a divorce, the courts
have noted that a trial judge could not refuse to apply the primary
caretaker factor simply because too much time had passed between the
date of initial separation and trial' s Thus, despite the fact that the

parents had been separated for several months or a year and were
operating under an agreed upon schedule, the courts can go into the
past and determine who was the primary caretaker before the
separation.
Minnesota also has certain custodial factors that focus on the health
of all parties involved in the custody dispute. 58 Specifically, Minnesota
courts must look to "the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved."'59 Furthermore, a parent's psychological health may have a
negative impact on physical custody rights even if it has not directly
impacted the child.'6

Minnesota also requires courts to look at "the

capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love, affection,
and guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child in the
child's culture and religion or creed, if any.""'6 Wisconsin does not have
156. Steinke v. Steinke, 428 N.W.2d 579, 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Pikula v.
Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705,713 (Minn. 1985)); see also infra note 217 and accompanying text.
157. Maxfield v. Maxfield, 439 N.W.2d 411,414-16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
158. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(9). However, a disability as defined in section
363.01 is not "determinative of custody of the child, unless the proposed custodial
arrangement is not in the best interest of the child." Id.
159. Id. See Vandewege v. Vandewege, 170 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Minn. 1969) (noting that
the wife's course of conduct toward the husband and children demonstrated that the wife had
a serious emotional disorder and that an award of physical custody to the husband was
appropriate).
160. Schumm v. Schumm, 510 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). In Schumr, the
court noted that the mother's mental health problems, which rendered her unable to work
because of depression, raised a prima facie case of disability for the purpose of evaluating the
statutory custody factors. Id. However, the court also made note that the mother's
psychological problems caused her to be unable to engage in most activities for several days.
Id.
161. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(10). See Trebelhorn v. Uecker, 362 N.W.2d 342
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985). In Trebelhorn, the court of appeals affirmed the award of physical
custody to the father. Id. at 347. The court noted that the father's relationship with his twoyear-old son was one of "genuine affection and love," that the father had "provided live-in
day care at the family home" for several months to allow the wife to work outside the home,
and that the father was very "well versed" in nurturing the child. Id. at 345. The court
concluded with the determination that the father was better able to provide guidance and
values for the child than was the mother. Id. See also Johnson v. Johnson, 424 N.W.2d 85,
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a similar factor. While this consideration appears to address the level of
consistency that a child will have with any given parent, its focus on the
parent's capacity suggests that this factor focuses mainly on a parent's

mental state. Minnesota courts must also consider the "child's cultural
background.' 112 This factor does not exist in Wisconsin ' and it is
difficult to see how it is to be applied.'" That is, if the court expounded
on this factor to any great extent, it would be difficult to avoid raising

concerns about ethnic and religious prejudice." 5

Within the general category of assessing the parent's behavior, the
courts in Minnesota also consider "the effect on the child of the actions
of an abuser."'" Further, except in cases in which such domestic abuse
has occurred, the court must evaluate "the disposition of each parent to
encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact by the other
parent with the child."'" Obviously, if evidence exists that one parent
will discourage or hinder contact by the other parent with the child, the
court will seek to ameliorate the problem in fashioning a physical
custody arrangement. Such a physical custody arrangement would likely
afford the offending parent with significantly less time than the nonoffending parent. Wisconsin has behavioral factors similar to both of
the above. 6
Both Wisconsin and Minnesota have custodial factors in each of the
four general custodial categories outlined above. Addressing the
88-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that an award of physical custody of the children who
had been raised Catholic, to the father, who intended to raise the children Lutheran, failed to
give realistic consideration to the parties' ability, capacity and disposition to continue raising
the children in their religion).
162. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(11).
163. See WIs. STAT. § 767.24(5)(d) (1999-2000) (noting that Wisconsin courts must
consider the adjustment of the child to the child's religion, but does not include a reference to
culture or creed).
164. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(10) (indicating that the court must consider
the disposition and capacity of a parent in "raising the child in the child's culture and religion
or creed").
165. Although any inquiry into this area is problematic, compare the restrictions that
Wisconsin places on this inquiry, which are present in the case of Welker v. Welker, 24 Wis.2d
570,575-78, N.W.2d 134,137-39 (1964).
166. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(12). See Uhl v. Uhl, 413 N:W.2d 213 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987). In Uhl, the court considered the abuse perpetrated by the mother upon the
children. Id. at 214-15. Nevertheless, the court awarded physical custody of the children to
the mother because the mother's actions were not repetitive, but were mitigated by the stress
she was under and she seemed willing to change. Id. at 217.
167. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(a)(13).
168. WIS. STAT. § 767.24.
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parenting issues in each of those general categories is important to
achieving a healthy placement arrangement for a child. Nevertheless,
there are a large number of judges applying those custodial factors in
each state and an equally large number of appellate judges reviewing
the manner in which those custodial factors are applied at the trial level.
While neither state has a statute that is defective on its face, the extent
to which the best interests of children are served in Wisconsin and
Minnesota depends largely on the way that a judge applies those factors.
Thus, a third party, in the form of a trial court judge or an appellate
court judge, decides what is best for the children of a divorcing family
when he or she is probably in the worst position to evaluate what is best
for that family. In recognition of this problem, and in an attempt to
rectify it, a new concept has been introduced into both states-parenting
plans.
C. A New Option:ParentingPlans

The trial court.process is not the most therapeutic setting in which to
resolve a family's disagreements about raising children. In fact, when
engaged in a conflict about the living arrangements for their children,
parents can easily lose sight of the traumatic situation into which they
are placing their children. In a report on the ABC News program 20/20,
that traumatic situation was seen first hand in an interview with a child
whose parents were involved in a divorce. When asked about the effect
of the divorce process on his life, the child indicated "my parents
couldn't talk to each other. They started fighting. My dad... stopped
coming around as much. My mom stopped coming around as much
because of court. And from then on everything is just different."'69
When asked if he wanted to tell his father anything about the divorce,
he indicated "[j]ust stop, just end it. Forget about it. If you stop, my
mom will stop. And if you give up, my mom will give up. That's it.
And whatever happens, happens. Start a new life. Turn over a new leaf
and start from the beginning. It's got to stop."'70 These are the types of
situations which can be created by the current custody and placement
laws in the various states. While custody and placement laws may not
even be needed in those situations where two divorcing parties
communicate extremely well about their children and focus their energy
169. ABC News 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, May 24, 2000) (transcript on file with
author).
170. Id.
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on helping their children work within the reality of a divided family,
those same laws can create tragic dynamics for the children of divorcing
couples.
In an effort to prevent that dynamic from arising in the context of a
divorce, many states have turned to the concept of parenting plans.
Parenting plan legislation is seen by its supporters as a more "fact
specific" and "individualized" way of resolving custody issues.171
Washington was one of the first states to enact legislation mandating
parenting plans for divorcing couples." Wisconsin passed parenting
plan legislation in 1999,173 while Minnesota passed such legislation in
T
As it has developed throughout the United States, the goal of
2000.'
parenting plan legislation is to provide parents with a way to direct their
own parenting arrangement and avoid a resolution through application
of custodial factors by a judge who can not possibly be fully informed on
the needs of a divorcing family. 75
The genesis of parenting plans appears to have been in the ever
increasing movement by many states over the past few decades toward
the creation of joint custody statutes. 76 These joint custody statutes
followed on the heels of the above-mentioned tender years statutes and
pure best interests of the child statutes. The concept of parenting plans
arose from "mental health and family law professionals affiliated with
the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts." The goal of those
professionals, recognizing the benefit of consistent contact with both
mother and father, was to encourage better cooperation between
parents following the breakup of their marriage.1 78 One commentator
noted that parenting plan legislation nationwide has historically focused
on two goals: "(1) shared parenting, and (2) limitations on shared

171. Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections, and Professional Intervention: Innovations in
Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal Professionals,24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 65,
70 n.10 (1990).
172. Heather Crosby, The Irretrievable Breakdown of the Child- Minnesota's Move
Toward ParentingPlans,21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 489,509 (2000).
173. WIS. STAT. § 767.24(Im) (1999-2000); see also infra note 181.
174. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705 (West Supp. 2002); see also infra note 186; Peter V.
Rother, Balancing Custody Issues: Minnesota'sNew ParentingPlanStatute, 57 MINN. BENCH
& B., Dec. 2000, at 27.
175. Crosby, supra note 172, at 490-91.
176. Id. at 509 n.80.
177. Ellis, supra note 171, at 70 n.10.
178. Id.
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parenting."'7 9 That is, they attempt to provide meaningful access to
children by both parents, yet at the same time recognizing that one of

the parents may come into a divorce process in a weaker position and
needing protection because of abuse or financial insecurity."
In Wisconsin, development of parenting plan legislation mirrors that
of the national trend. That is, at the same time the Wisconsin legislature

was considering joint placement legislation and legislation that required
divorce courts to look at maximizing the amount of time each parent
spent with the children, the parenting plan statute came into existence.

Wisconsin's parenting plan law mandates that each parent complete and
submit to the court a detailed scheme of parenting duties and

responsibilities. 8' The concept of the parenting plan has been a part of
179. Id. at 79.
180. Id at 79-80.
181. WIS. STAT. § 767.24(lm) (1999-2000). This section reads as follows:
In an action for annulment, divorce or legal separation, an action to determine
paternity or an action under s. 767.02(1)(e) or 767.62(3) in which legal custody or
physical placement is contested, a party seeking sole or joint legal custody or periods
of physical placement shall file a parenting plan with the court before any pretrial
conference. Except for cause shown, a party required to file a parenting plan under
this subsection who does not timely file a parenting plan waives the right to object to
the other party's parenting plan. A parenting plan shall provide information about
the following questions:
(a) What legal custody or physical placement the parent is seeking.
(b) Where the parent lives currently and where the parent intends to live during
the next 2 years. If there is evidence that the other parent engaged in interspousal
battery, as described under s. 940.19 or 940.20 (1m), or domestic abuse, as defined in
s. 813.12(1)(a), with respect to the parent providing the parenting plan, the parent
providing the parenting plan is not required to disclose the specific address but only
a general description of where he or she currently lives and intends to live during the
next 2 years.
(c) Where the parent works and the hours of employment. If there is evidence
that the other parent engaged in interspousal battery, as described under s. 940.19 or
940.20(lm), or domestic abuse, as defined in s. 813.12(1)(a), with respect to the
parent providing the parenting plan, the parent providing the parenting plan is not
required to disclose the specific address but only a general description of where he
or she works.
(d) Who will provide any necessary child care when the parent cannot and who
will pay for the child care.
(e)Where the child will go to school.
(f) What doctor or health care facility will provide medical care for the child.
(g) How the child's medical expenses will be paid.
(h) What the child's religious commitment will be, if any.
(i) Who will make decisions about the child's education, medical care, choice of
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the Wisconsin Family Code for over one year with results that are
somewhat uncertain. That is, quite often courts will not even require
the submission of such a plan even though they are mandatory
according to the statute. For these litigants, the parenting plan process
is of no benefit. Nevertheless, for those that do engage in the process,
parenting plans have two benefits. First, parenting plans force couples
to think about various issues that are often overlooked at the time of
divorce, such as day care, recreational activities, and education related
issues for children who have not yet entered school.' Second, requiring
the parties to a divorce to think about these issues prior to the pre-trial
conference may induce settlement of custody and placement disputes
prior to the final hearing.'
Minnesota's parenting plan legislation was initially introduced in the
Minnesota House of Representatives by Representative Andy Dawkins
in 1997.' m His purpose in doing so was to bring change to the "winnertake all system of choosing one parent over the other when we have two
good, experienced parents.""5 Ironically, the Minnesota parenting plan
law.8 did not arise with a corresponding change in the Minnesota
child care providers and extracurricular activities.
(j) How the holidays will be divided.
(k) What the child's summer schedule will be.
(L) (sic) Whether and how the child will be able to contact the other parent
when the child has physical placement with the parent providing the parenting plan.
(m) How the parent proposes to resolve disagreements related to matters over
which the court orders joint decision making.
(n) What child support, family support, maintenance or other income transfer
there will be.
(o) If there is evidence that either party engaged in interspousal battery, as
described under s. 940.19 or 940.20(lm), or domestic abuse, as defined in s.
813.12(1)(a), with respect to the other party, how the child will be transferred
between the parties for the exercise of physical placement to ensure the safety of the
child and the parties.
Id.
182. Gregg Herman, Custody and PlacementRevisions Still Soaking In, WIs. OPINIONS,
Nov. 1, 2000, at 9.
183. Id.
184. Andy Dawkins, A Sea of Change in Family Law Takes More Than One Session, at
http://www.freenet.msp.mn.us/orglr-kids/dawkins.html (last visited Feb. 22,2002).
185. Id.
186. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705 (West Supp. 2002). This section states in part:
Subdivision 1. Definition. "Domestic abuse" for the purposes of this section
has the meaning given in section 518B.01, subdivision 2.
Subd. 2. Plan elements. (a) A parenting plan must include the following:
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custodial factors as occurred in Wisconsin. That is, Minnesota did not
pass any further legislation in support of joint physical custody. Initial
attempts to pass the reform legislation failed,'

but the legislature

formed a task force to study the concept of parenting plans.'
In his push for parenting plan legislation, one of the proposals made
by Representative Dawkins, which found its way into the final bill, was

that the terminology used in the realm of custody and placement laws be
revised based upon the fact that the current custody and visitation
language represented concepts of possession or control.'89 Minnesota's
parenting plan legislation permits parents to use whatever labels they
choose as long as those terms are defined by the parents.' ° In
Wisconsin, the opposite is true. Wisconsin requires each parent to set
forth the exact legal custody or physical placement arrangement that the

(1) a schedule of the time each parent spends with the child;
(2) a designation of decision-making responsibilities regarding the child; and
(3) a method of dispute resolution.
(b) A parenting plan may include other issues and matters the parents agree to
regarding the child.
(c) Parents voluntarily agreeing to parenting plans may substitute other terms
for physical and legal custody, including designations of joint or sole custody,
provided that the terms used in the substitution are defined in the parenting plan.
Subd. 3. Creating parenting plan; restrictions on creation; alternative. (a)
Upon the request of both parents, a parenting plan must be created in lieu of an
order for child custody and parenting time unless the court makes detailed findings
that the proposed plan is not in the best interests of the child.
(b) If both parents do not agree to a parenting plan, the court may create one
on its own motion, except that the court must not do so if it finds that a parent has
committed domestic abuse against a parent or child who is a party to, or subject of,
the matter before the court. If the court creates a parenting plan on its own motion,
it must not use alternative terminology unless the terminology is agreed to by the
parties.
(c) If an existing order does not contain a parenting plan, the parents must not
be required to create a parenting plan as part of a modification order under section
518.64.
(d) A parenting plan must not be required during an action under section
256.87.
(e) If the parents do not agree to a parenting plan and the court does not create
one on its own motion, orders for custody and parenting time must be entered under
sections 518.17 and 518.175 or section 257.541, as applicable.
Id.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Rother, supra note 174, at 27.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.
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parent is seeking.' In this sense, Minnesota's legislation is preferable.
Quite often divorce litigants get caught up in obtaining a label rather
than in obtaining a particular parenting arrangement.
Minnesota
19
not.
does
Wisconsin
and
situation
that
addresses
Wisconsin's legislation clearly provides more structure for parties in
designing their parenting plan. There are fifteen items that parents must
address for the court prior to the pre-trial conference.'93 These items
range from schooling, day care, and health care to such things as a
parent's plan for living arrangements over the next two years. 4
Minnesota simply directs its divorcing parents to three broad
categories-a schedule, a designation of decision-making responsibilities
and a method of dispute resolution.' This difference in structure may
simply be a reflection of the biggest difference between these two
parenting plan models-Wisconsin's is mandatory' 9 while Minnesota's is
voluntary.' 7
Advantages and disadvantages exist for both Wisconsin's mandatory
and Minnesota's voluntary parenting plans.
Wisconsin requires
parenting plans to be submitted to the court prior to the pre-trial
conference.'
In a sense, this forces parents to undertake the detailed
analysis of the necessities of raising their children. The detailed list of
items that parents must consider is useful in prodding those who
otherwise might not reflect on the needs of the children and give the
process the in-depth thought it needs. In Minnesota, however, parents
are only undergoing the process of designing a parenting plan because
they want to do so. In that sense, they are already mentally invested in
the process and can probably be given a little more latitude in what they
need to consider. Nevertheless, neither state permits much latitude
when it comes to domestic abuse.' 9 Both states provide protection to

191. WIs. STAT. § 767.24(lm)(a) (1999-2000).
192. Despite the fact that the parenting plan legislation requires parents to set forth legal
custody and physical placement designations, one commentator has noted that Wisconsin's
parenting plan legislation actually helps litigants get past the "fighting words" of legal custody
and physical placement. Walther, supra note 86, at 19.
193. WIs. STAT. § 767.24(lm).
194. Id.
195. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (West Supp. 2002)
196. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(lm).
197. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705.
198. Wis. STAT. § 767.24(lm).
199. See WIs. STAT. § 767.24(lm)(o); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705(3)(b).
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victims of such abuse in their parenting plan legislation."
Parenting plan statutes are legislative attempts at evolution in the
custody and placement realm. Just as custody theory has evolved from
children as property of the father, to a paternal presumption, to a
maternal presumption, and finally, to an analysis of custodial factors
under pure best interests of the child statutes, so too are parenting plans
an attempt to evolve custody disputes beyond the stage that is typified
by the 20/20 excerpt. The jury is still out on how complete that
evolution will be or whether parenting plans will simply be a dead-end
that fades out after a few years. However, to the extent that parenting
plans are not mandatory for divorcing couples, there will never be a
complete departure from custodial factors.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The custodial factors of Wisconsin and Minnesota were designed to
assist trial judges in determining which parent is the more appropriate
one to have custody of the children in a divorce, while parenting plan
legislation was designed in an effort to avoid the need to apply those
custodial factors. Certain conclusions can be drawn based upon the
current implementation of the custodial factors in Wisconsin and
Minnesota, and based upon the current implementation of parenting
plan statutes in both states.
A. Parent'sRights in the Wisconsin CustodialFactors
As the above example from the ABC News Program 20/20 indicates,
a child in a divorce action can be in a tumultuous circumstance. Yet, a
child's position in a divorce action is different than a child's position in
an action under the Wisconsin Children's Code. Under the Wisconsin
Children's Code, a court has the straight-forward task of assessing the
best interests of the child regarding placement."1 In fact, under the
Children's Code, the courts are often in the position of placing a child
outside of the parent's home based upon egregious conduct by the
parents. In a divorce action, however, the court must necessarily
balance a child's best interests with the rights of parents to see their
children. Thus, there is a dual focus in divorce actions despite the
standard of the best interests of the child-a focus on the child's needs
200. Id.
201. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.01(1) (West Supp. 2001).

2002)

CHILD CUSTODY STATUTES

and a focus on the parent's rights.
Several of the new factors that were added to section 767.24(5)' of
the Wisconsin Statutes, as well as the requirement that the court look
toward maximizing the amount of time that the child spends with each
parent, seem to focus on the rights of the parent rather than the needs of
the child. This is evident from the legislative history of those factors. 3
There is certainly no problem with adding factors that demonstrate the
reality of the court's task. However, the Wisconsin legislature should
take a cautious approach to expanding the parental rights type factors in
the future given the extent to which they have emphasized those
paternal rights in the most recent legislation. While the guardian ad
litem system gives children a somewhat limited voice, the parents are
the driving force behind custody fights. Continual emphasis on parental
rights type factors may have the unintended effect of increasing the
volume of litigation over placement of children.
Further, through the parental rights factors and the requirement to
maximize the amount of time with each parent, a parent who has
otherwise had a negative impact on a child may be given a renewed
sense of power. That is, when preparing his or her parenting plan, a
parent who has a motive other than the best interests of the child may
see the parenting plan legislation as simply an opportunity to exercise
those rights rather than as an opportunity to help the child.
B. The Resurgence of Presumptions
Along these same lines, developments in Minnesota custody and
placement laws over the last fifteen years provide significant instruction
for Wisconsin, especially in light of Wisconsin's recent experience with
these new factors and the original Gary George Bill. As stated above,
the original Senate Bill 107 contained a provision that created a
The possibility of a joint
presumption of joint physical placement.
physical placement presumption suggests that Wisconsin is exploring the
possibility of eliminating the focus on the child's best interests and
focusing instead on a presumption. This is a very ominous turn in the
debate about custody and placement in Wisconsin because with such a
turn, we begin to lose sight of the need to view each and every child as
an individual with individual needs. Minnesota's recent experience with
202. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
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a primary caretaker presumption should be a warning to Wisconsin that
instituting a presumption into child custody cases can be disastrous for
everyone involved, especially the children.

Minnesota's experiment with the primary caretaker presumption
started with the case of Pikula v. Pikula.2 That case addressed the issue
of the physical custody of Dana and Kelly Pikula's two daughters. The
trial court heard evidence for two days, including testimony from the
parties and from relatives, and a custody evaluation report based on the

recommendations of three separate social workers."

Ultimately, the

trial court awarded physical custody to the father.'
The mother
appealed this decision.o The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the

trial court, noting that the evidence did not support the award of
custody to the father.1

In fact, the intermediate appellate court not

only reversed the trial court's decision, but also changed the custody
order and awarded custody to the mother.211
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted discretionary review of the
case and reversed the court of appeals.
The court noted that "the

evidence was adequate to support the findings which the trial court did
205.
206.
207.
208.

374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 707-08.
Id. at 708-09. In its Amended Finding 11, the trial court noted, interalia,

That there is a strong, stable, religious family group relationship within the Pikula
family, including respondent and the children, that has been developed, nurtured
and cultivated over the years. It has stood like a bedrock through the depression
years and post-war years of plenty and permissiveness. This environment has inbred
in the family, including respondent, a unity, respect, loyalty and love that for the
most part has been destroyed and lost in most modern American families. It is in
the best interests and welfare of the children that their custody be awarded to
respondent, who shares these attributes and who will assure that these children will
be raised in the present cultural, family, religious and community environment ....
Id. at 709. In its Amended Finding 12, the trial court noted, interalia,
That the environment in which petitioner finds herself is almost the exact opposite
of that in which the respondent lives and will raise the children, it would subject the
children to considerable uncertainty and instability in home, community, culture,
persons and religion, should custody be awarded to petitioner. ...
Id.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 707.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 709-10.
Id. at 714.
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make."2 However, having decided to reverse the court of appeals, the
Minnesota Supreme Court remanded the case, finding that the trial
court had misinterpreted Minnesota Statute section 518.17.214 The court
noted:

[T]he factors set forth in section 518.17, subd. 1, require that
when both parents seek custody of a child too young to express a
preference for a particular parent and one parent has been the
primary caretaker, custody be awarded to the primary parent
absent a showing that that parent is unfit to be the custodian.15
The court went on to further discuss the meaning of primary
caretaker. The court set forth a non-exclusive list of child rearing tasks,
the performance of which by any given parent, would help direct the
court toward the parent that was the primary caretaker. 6 These tasks
included:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and
dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4)
medical care, including nursing and trips to. physicians; (5)
arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e.
transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy
scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting,
day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child
in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning; (8)
disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet training; (9)
educating, i.e., religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10) teaching
elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.
Prior to Minnesota's adoption of the primary caretaker presumption
in Pikula, only one state had adopted a similar presumption in child
custody situations."' The Supreme Court of the State of West Virginia

213. Id. at 710.
214. Id. at 713-14.
215. Id. at 713.
216. Id.; see also supra note 156 and accompanying text.
217. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713 (citing Garksa v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va.
1981)).
218. Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the
Dynamics of Greed,3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168,180 (1984).
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adopted such a presumption in the case of Garska v. McCoy 19 in 1981.
The West Virginia court argued that by controlling the discretion held
by trial courts and providing predictability to the results, it would reduce
the number of custody cases that were litigated at the trial court levelm
Minnesota, apparently, was attempting to accomplish the same
objectives. As one commentator noted, "Minnesota's experience [with
the primary caretaker presumption] exemplifies the tension in child
custody law between a need for predictable results and an equally
compelling need to freely consider variations in each family situation."2'
Nevertheless, while supporters of the presumption argued that it would
reduce litigation on custody issues because it would inject some
certainty into the resultt the opposite proved to be true.m
Criticisms of the primary caretaker presumption were plentiful in
One commentator noted that critics of the primary
Minnesota.'
caretaker presumption viewed the presumption as disregarding "at least
five primary child interests."m The first of those interests was that the
"application of the standard can imperil important parent-child
The second way in which the child's interest was being
bonds."' '
sacrificed by the primary caretaker presumption was that the
presumption had an "inevitable emphasis on the past.' m Third, "that
greater consideration should be given to which parent is the better
provider of certain types of critical care, such as health care, education
and religious training. '"m It was also believed that the presumption
might be harmful to parent-child bonding "because it might imperil
close child contact with both parents. "22, Lastly, the presumption did not
protect the children "against harmful caretaking that does not constitute

219. 278 S.E.2d 357.
220. Id. at 361.
221. Crippen, supra note 53, at 429.
222. Id. at 446 (citing Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713). The Minnesota Supreme Court
predicted that the primary caretaker presumption would largely eliminate custody disputes
from divorces. Id.
223. See id. at 452 (noting that the primary caretaker presumption actually "caused an
explosion of litigation in Minnesota").
224. See generally Ahl, supra note 12; Crippen, supra note 53.
225. Crippen, supra note 53, at 489.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 490.
228. Id. at 491.
229. Id.
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unfitness or clearly dangerous conduct. ,230
As in Wisconsin's struggle with the Gary George Bill, the Minnesota
State Bar Association helped bring down the primary caretaker
presumption created in Pikula. 1 At a meeting of the Minnesota State
Bar Association in February 1989, the Family Law Section
recommended eliminating the preference2 2 Fathers groups urged the
state bar association to abolish the preference which they perceived as
disregarding their parent-child relationship,'3 while mothers groups
lobbied against abolishing the preference.'
Despite this
experimentation with a presumption favoring the traditional care
provider, the primary caretaker presumption eventually went the way of
past custody presumptions. In 1989, the Minnesota legislature abolished
the primary caretaker preference by passing an amendment to section
518.17 of the Minnesota Statutes which states that "[t]he primary
caretaker factor may not be used as a presumption in determining the
best interests of the child."2 5
While Minnesota no longer labors under a legal presumption in
custody cases, some of the problems Minnesota experienced with the
primary caretaker presumption provide lessons for Wisconsin. Each set
of circumstances in a divorce situation are different. The parties and the
children have different needs from one case to the next. Further, the
parties have different capacities to provide those needs from one case to
the next. In fact, one psychologist has noted that, when he was asked
whether a particular schedule serves the best interests of a child, his
' ' This comment reflects the idea that any
response was, "it depends."2
particular placement schedule must be a reflection of various factors
affecting a child.2
By continuing to toy with a joint placement
230. I& at 492.
231. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
232. Crippen, supra note 53, at 494 n.227.
233. Id.
234. Id
235. MINN. STAT. ANN. 518.17(1)(a) (West Supp. 2002).
236. Kenneth H. Waldron, Don't Split the Baby, Physical Placement and the
Developmental Needs of Children, Seminar (May 26, 1995).
237. Id Doctor Waldron cited seventeen separate factors that should be considered
when fashioning a schedule that will reflect the child's best interests. Those factors are: age of
the children, sex of the child, temperament of the child, past experiences of the child, children
with special needs, siblings, supports for the child, supports for the parents, geographic
distance between homes, work hours of parents, financial resources, personal needs of the
parents, conduct problems, parenting strengths and weaknesses, consistency and stability,
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presumption, Wisconsin will continue to be at risk of placing the
children of its divorcing couples into problematic situations and into
placement arrangements that bear no relationship to their needs or to
the parents' abilities to provide for those needs. Wisconsin's legislators
need to be wary of this fact and avoid the temptation to try and make
custody decisions "easy." While preferences and presumptions favoring
one parent or the other have been part of Wisconsin's history since its
inception, 8 these presumptions can subvert the best interests of the
child standard, which is the basis for the state's custody laws.2 9 The
example offered by Minnesota's recent experiment with a primary
caretaker presumption is illustrative.
C. Minnesota and JointPhysical Custody
While Minnesota's recent past provides some useful lessons to
Wisconsin, some of Wisconsin's recent legislation is also instructive for
Minnesota. As discussed earlier, the joint placement provisions in
Senate Bill 107, also known as the Gary George Bill, did not succeed in
passing the Wisconsin legislature.m
Nevertheless, the resulting
compromise bill did provide several things for Minnesota to consider.
As stated above, several of the new factors recently incorporated into
Wisconsin Statute section 767.24(5) focus on the parent's rights of access
to the child. While the Wisconsin legislature needs to exercise caution
in incorporating further factors into its statutory scheme that focus on
parents rights, those recent additions do not appear in Minnesota's
statutory scheme.
In Minnesota, there is a line of case law that discourages joint
physical custody in divorce cases. In the case of Rosenfeld v.
Rosenfeld,241 a Minnesota intermediate appellate court addressed the
issue of joint physical custody. In that case, a husband and wife had
reached a stipulated physical custody schedule for their children at the
time of their final divorce.22 The schedule called for, inter alia, the two
oldest children to live with the mother during the school year and with
the father during the summer months.243 There were additional periods
communication and cooperation between parents, and access to both parents. Id.
238. Hofer, supra note 31, at 343.
239. Id
240. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
241. 529 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
242. Id at 725.
243. Id.
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of overnight physical custody for each parent during the period of time
when the other parent had physical custody.2" The mother subsequently
filed a motion requesting that she be awarded sole physical custody
because the schedule was not working for the parties or the child. 245
However, the court noted that the mother was simply requesting a
change in the label that was being given to the current schedule, rather
than an actual change in the schedule itself.246 Thus, the mother already
had sole physical custody for nine months out of the year and the father
had sole physical custody for the other three months. 247 The court of
appeals rejected the request by the mother for a change in the label to
"sole physical custody" because the court determined that the mother
had not presented a "justiciable controversy., 24
During its analysis, the court noted that the term joint physical
custody was not precisely defined by Minnesota Statutes. 249 However,
the court loosely defined it as any arrangement where "the routine daily
care and control and the residence of the child is structured between the
parties."' The court went on to note that such arrangements are not
looked upon favorably.2' 1 The court indicated that "[j]oint physical
custody is not a preferred custody arrangement due to the instability,
turmoil, and lack of continuity inherent in such an arrangement and is
not generally in a child's best interest."2 The court further stated "that
the designation of a placement depends on its characteristics, not its
label."23 Two cases were cited in support of the court's view that joint
physical custody was not a preferred arrangement under Minnesota
law.'
However, while Minnesota has a line of cases that appears to
discourage joint physical custody arrangements, it also has a statute that
must be applied in the event a trial court seeks to enter a joint physical
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 727.
247. Id. at 726.
248. Id.at 727.
249. Id. at 726.
250. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.003(3)(d) (West 1992)).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id
254. Wopata v. Wopata, 498 N.W.2d 478, 483 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that while
mother and father may be "equally qualified to raise the children ...[that] does not mean
that they are qualified to raise them jointly"); see also Peterson v. Peterson, 393 N.W.2d 503,
506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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placement order. 5
These three cases were not the only occasions in which the
Minnesota appellate courts had expressed this view. In the case of
Steinke v. Steinke,2 6 the court of appeals addressed a situation in which a
mother appealed an award of joint physical custody to the father by the
trial court.25 The court noted that the trial court had made three
errors: 8 First, the trial court had failed "to determine which parent was
the primary caretaker" under the Pikula standard. 9 Second, the court
had failed to justify its disregard of the preference of the ten-year-old
child .2' Finally, the court had disregarded the preference against joint
physical placement absent "exceptional circumstances." ' While it is
important to note that this case occurred during the era when the
primary caretaker presumption reigned supreme, the court made a
separate finding that Minnesota had a preference against joint physical
placement. 262
Under Wisconsin's new factors and the new directive that courts
attempt to maximize the amount of time that children have with their
parents, the aforementioned case law would likely be overturned.
Minnesota should look carefully at Wisconsin's shared placement
statutory scheme and consider adopting some of its provisions. Of
particular interest to the State of Minnesota should be the factor that
addresses "[t]he amount and quality of time that each parent has spent
with the child in the past ...and any reasonable life-style changes that a

parent proposes to make to be able to spend time with the child in the
future."263 This factor appears to encompass Minnesota's focus on the
primary caretaker while offering an additional dimension. It offers a
parent, who entered into an agreement with his or her spouse to be the
bread winner in the family, the opportunity to reassess that role in light
of the divorce. That parent would have the opportunity to change that
255. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2) (West Supp. 2002).
256. 428 N.W.2d 579 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
257. Id. at 581.
258. Id. at 584.
259. IdL
260. Id
261. Id.
262. Id. at 583 (noting that, in awarding joint physical custody, the trial court had
ignored "the preference against divided physical custody, which applies unless there is
.evidence of unusual circumstances, either special reasons for the arrangement or special
accommodations to ease disruption and instability for the child').
263. WIS. STAT. § 767.24(5)(cm) (1999-2000).
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role of bread-winner-only to the role of bread winner and caretaker.
When two people, contemplating an indefinite marital union, enter into
an agreement to structure their lives in a certain way in order to
maximize efficiency, it is not fair to penalize one parent because he or
she failed to consider the effect of that decision if the parties divorced.
The Minnesota legislature should carefully consider this issue with a
view toward eliminating the court-created preference against joint
physical placement.
D. Wresting the Wisdom From Solomon-ParentingPlans

Parenting plans have arisen as a method to avoid protracted
litigation about children." They are meant to provide parents with a
way of thinking through the custody arrangements that will best work
for their family once the divorce is finalized without the need to resort
to a judge. While it is certainly appropriate to provide parents the
opportunity to design their own placement arrangement, there is no
doubt that the custodial factors can influence the design of that plan.
Thus, if a parent perceives that his or her chances in contested litigation
are minimal, they will have a greater incentive to propose a parenting
plan that is closely aligned with those litigious expectations. With this in
mind, it is easy to see how changes in the focus of the custodial
factors,
such as occurred in Wisconsin, can have a dramatic impact on how a
parent views their chances in court and, consequently, the parenting
plan which they submit. The custodial factors become the "hammer"
that encourages parents to reach an agreement.
Certainly, the creation of a presumption in favor of joint physical
custody of children would have an impact on the way a parent designs
his or her parenting plan. Further, it may impact the willingness of a
parent to settle on a given parenting plan. Therefore, parenting plan
legislation is not, in an absolute sense, parent driven. Rather, it is a
legislatively directed settlement.
Despite this attempt by the legislature to direct parties toward
settlement, there are two assumptions built into parenting plan
264. The Minnesota legislature accurately expressed the five main goals behind
parenting plans: 1) to reduce the number of costly legal battles in custody and visitation
proceedings; 2) to eliminate the deep wounds that result from custody and visitation
litigation; 3) to improve the future relations between the parties; 4) to maximize the
involvement of both parents; and 5) to create healthier families. Audio Tape: Parenting
Plans, 2000: Hearings on H.F. 3311 Before the House Civil Law Committee, 81st Leg., 2000
Reg. Sess., Tape 1, Side B (March 2,2000) (statement of Rep. Andy Dawkins).
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legislation that can lead to problems. First, there is an assumption that,
given the right information, parents will tend to come up with an
agreement on how they are going to structure their parenting
arrangement after a divorce. However, this fails to recognize that
parents can oftentimes have a genuine and reasonable disagreement
about certain issues involving the raising of their children. These types
of disagreements arise even for intact families. However, in families
that are intact, there is usually a compromise worked out between the
parents based upon their own internal desire to reach agreement with
each other. Yet, in divorced families the same cannot always be said.
These "reasonable disagreement" situations may not lend themselves to
solutions with a parenting plan.
The second problem with the parenting plan theory is that it is based
upon the assumption that parents are motivated to propose schedules
that serve the best interests of their children. However, most couples
who are disposed to reaching agreements with their spouse were already
doing so without parenting plans. Rather, they are successfully reaching
agreements in the mediation process, which is mandatory in
Wisconsin, 2' but voluntary in Minnesota.266 In addition, there is nothing
about the parenting plan theory that can adequately address the conflict
and problems that arise when one or both of the parents have other
motives besides their children's best interests.
For those parents, it is not a genuine disagreement that prevents a
successful resolution, nor is it a lack of information that creates in
parents an inability to reach agreement in the best interests of their
children, rather, it is a character defect-the parent or parents are
unwilling to put their children's needs ahead of their own. In situations
where parents have that type of disposition, there is nothing, including a
comprehensive parenting plan, which will avoid litigation.
It is clearly important for both states to continue pursuing legislation
that seeks peaceful resolutions to custody and placement disputes.
However, it is unlikely that parenting plans will become a panacea for
resolving such disputes in either state. There will be a certain segment
of divorce litigants who will be able to solve their disputes through the
parenting plan process, but there will also be those couples who, for
whatever reasons, will simply not agree and need to litigate. While
some potential settlements may be missed in Minnesota because of the
265. Wis. STAT. § 767.11(5)(a).
266. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619 (West Supp. 2002).
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non-mandatory nature of parenting plans, Wisconsin courts need to be
more vigilant in enforcement of the parenting plan requirement or an
equal number of settlement opportunities may be missed. It goes
without saying that the legislatures of both states need to continue to
monitor the implementation of the parenting plans in order to make
improvements when indicated.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A Wisconsin appellate court noted in the case of Kerkvliet v.
Kerkvlietr 7 that the statutory factors that a family court must consider in
making an initial award of physical placement are not exhaustive.28 The
court noted that "there is no hard-and-fast rule or formula... for
determining what combination of factors will ultimately assure the
future welfare of a child... of a broken home."269 This is certainly the
case. Each custody and placement dispute is distinct. However, it is not
so much the actual factors considered by the court as it is the fact that
the court has some discretion in fashioning a placement schedule that
meets the needs of the child. While it could certainly be debated that
bright line rules and presumptions are the only way that all parties can
be assured that a trial court's prejudices will not influence its decisions,
it is equally true that such bright line rules could diminish a child's
ability to cope with the breakup of his or her family.
It goes without saying that a child should be afforded the
opportunity to learn and grow from each of his or her parents.
However, it is equally true that a parent should be afforded the
opportunity to learn and grow from his or her children. Wisconsin's
increased awareness of the need for each parent to have meaningful
access to his or her children should be seen as a positive development in
physical custody and placement laws-as long as this awareness does not
turn into some form of a weapon in child support disputes or a vendetta
by a vindictive spouse.
Minnesota would do well to consider increasing its awareness of this
issue as well. While Minnesota does not have a prohibition against joint
physical custody, such arrangements are not necessarily encouraged. It
is certainly not possible to continue after the divorce the same level of
frequent and continuing contact that both parents had with the child
267. 166 Wis. 2d 930,480 N.W.2d 823 (Ct. App. 1992).
268. 1& at 935,480 N.W2d at 827.
269. Id. (quoting King v. King, 29 Wis. 2d 586,590,139 N.W.2d 635, 637 (1966)).
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before the divorce. However, by being aware of the benefits of joint
physical placement and by seeking to apply it in cases where it might
work, Minnesota would be affording its children and parents the
opportunity to benefit from one another.
Along the same lines, Wisconsin's recent adventure with Senate Bill
107 should be a concern to all people involved with the family law
system. From deep into the past comes the lesson that presumptions
cause more harm than good. The Roman law, the Anglo-Saxon law, the
English common law, and the American common law all demonstrate
that presumptions usually cause one party to lose a custody dispute for
reasons that are inexplicable and unrelated to the best interests of the
child."
Wisconsin should heed the lessons taught by Minnesota's
experience with the primary caretaker presumption. In the end, it
heightened litigation and resulted in decisions that were not based on
the reality of the divorced parties. While family court judges in
Wisconsin and Minnesota may not have the "wisdom of Solomon," they
need to be given the discretion to fashion placement schedules that
work for the children of divorce.
Parenting plans try to address these statutory defects and subjective
use of custodial authority of the courts by giving parents the ability to
design their own postdivorce parenting arrangement. They try to allow
parents the opportunity to exercise the "wisdom of Solomon." By
investing themselves in that process and in the best interests of their
children, divorcing mothers and fathers may avoid the need for a
divorce court to "examine how they differ from one another and which
is to be preferred. "2

270. See supra notes 5-27 and accompanying text.
271. See PLATO, supra note 1, at 106.

